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SOME LESSONS IN URBAN REGENERATION 
Jack Brand 
For the first sixty years of this century, Glasgow was a city on the way 
down. (I) By the 1970s, this was evident even in the city centre, with the west 
end of Sauchiehall Street: once a major centre of fashion: looking tatty and 
peppered with closed shops. Even worse was the historic centre running 
from the medieval High Street to Buchanan Street: the Merchant City. (2) 
Since 1980 this central area has been returned to prosperity. This 
chapter will examine how this was done, not for the sake of the Glasgow 
story alone, but for the lessons we can learn for urban regeneration 
elsewhere.O> This is particularly appropriate now, when the Government 
has set up Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) to manage the 
regeneration of inner city areas in England and Wales. <4> Parkinson points 
out that the philosophy of the UDCs is to remove the process of 
improvement from the local authorities, which are considered to be too 
political and inefficient, and to place it with an authority which has no local 
democratic responsibilities and is accountable only to the Government. (s) 
In the rebuilding of the Merchant City, we shall show that Glasgow 
District Council was the essential first mover and the body which, even up 
to the present moment, has forced the pace of change. This is all the more 
remarkable when one considers that Glasgow has had a Labour-dominated 
council, with breaks totalling only eight years, since 1933. <6> Even with this 
background, it has worked happily with developers and others in the 
private sector, and its cooperation with Scottish Development Agency 
(SDA) has brought outstanding results. 
It is clear that several agencies cooperated in Glasgow as opposed to 
the strategy of concentrating decision making and implementation in an 
Urban Development Corporation. I shall argue that there were clear 
advantages in that the local authority was able to do things which the SDA, 
or a UDC, could not do. By the same token, the Agency worked as a 
catalyst in the relationship between the Council and the Developers under 
certain circumstances; not just by providing more money, but also by its 
attitudes and its record. 
Finally, the events in Glasgow reveal something about the role of 
elected members in local government. It has been suggested that one 
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difference between British and US government, including local 
government, is that the elected members play little part in initiating and 
pursuing new developments. It will be shown that several Glasgow 
councillors made important contributions to the saving of the Merchant 
City. -
THE PROBLEMS OF THE MERCHANT CITY 
The area immediately to the west of the High Street has been settled as 
long as Glasgow has existed. Further to the West, the land was built upon as 
a result of the first wave of prosperity resulting from the tobacco trade in the 
eighteenth century. The mansions of the Tobacco Lords were the first 
buildings placed there. (7) As the city grew even richer it expanded 
westwards in the nineteenth century and the residences were mostly 
replaced by commercial buildings. Thus, by the end of the century and until 
the 1960s, the area performed several functions and, towards the end of this 
period, these enterprises failed or went to other sites. 
There are still some clothing manufacturers in the Merchant City, but 
their numbers have been drastically reduced since the 1950s by the cheaper 
prices of goods coming from the third world and by other competition. 
They depended on low rents and low profits and a (mainly female) labour 
force which was prepared to work for low wages and in bad conditions. The 
profits were undercut and the low rents were paid on ageing buildings which 
developed serious structural problems and were under constant threat of 
closure by the City's Department of Building Control and the Factory 
Inspectorate. Most of the 'rag trade' relocated or went out of business. 
As in London's Covent Garden, the Fruit Market was originaly near its 
retail outlets. For both areas the problems of space and streets too narrow 
to take the lorries and containerization later forced the users to look for a 
different site. In 1969, they moved to a greenfield site at Blochairn. Finally, 
the Merchant City was best known to ordinary Glaswegians because of a 
large number of retail warehouses such as Stirling Stevenson or Campbell, 
Stewart and Macdonald. In the 1970s, these businesses closed down as a 
result of competition from the chains and multiples which had opened in the 
City. They left huge buildings which did not have any obvious alternative 
use. 
Two other problems exacerbated the situation. One was that, as long 
ago as 1%5, Glasgow Corporation planned that the east flank of the ring 
road should come down the High Street: the eastern edge of the Merchant 
City: thus encouraging a broad band of planning blight there. (S) Another 
was that one of the few institutions to locate near the area since the war, the 
University of Strathclyde, first intended to expand into the area and then 
decided to move instead towards Glasgow Cathedral and the north end of 
the High Street. In order to facilitate the first intention, the Corporation 
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had acquired a large amount of property for which it later had no use. It had 
also acquired property through Compulsory Purchase Orders (CPOs) in 
order to prepare the way for the ring road. Along with other land and 
buildings obtained for different reasons, the City owned around sixty per 
cent of the vacant property within the boundaries of the area. There was 
great unease about this burden, but this was to be a crucial advantage in 
rebuilding the fortunes of the Merchant City. 
REGENERATING GLASGOW, REGENERATING THE MERCHANT 
CITY 
The regeneration of the Merchant City is part of a process which has 
affected much of the centre of Glasgow and beyond as far as the West End 
of Glasgow University and on the South Side. More than this, the people 
who now live in the smart flats, eat in the new restaurants, and shop in the 
boutiques have surplus cash which did not seem to be there ten years ago. 
The Merchant City and many other prosperous parts of Glasgow exist 
because certain sorts of Glaswegians now have more money and this, in 
part, is because the social arrangements have changed. When Glasgow's 
Director of Planning, James Rae, looked at the demographic trends in 
1974, he found that Glasgow, in common with other European cities,was 
affected by new patterns of family formation. <9> There are now many more 
single person households and many more couples with no children. These 
are precisely the categories whose members find it attractive to live in the 
Merchant City. Thus the very structure of Glasgow's population now 
encourages the development of this sort of area. Without family 
obligations, they have more disposable income and can afford to buy flats 
where before they would have been more inclined to rent in the public 
sector, both in order to afford a family and to be near their own parents and 
relatives. Rae and the Labour councillors agreed that it was important to 
accommodate these groups in the city. There was a fear that these young 
prosperous groups would otherwise leave the City for suburbs like 
Bearsden and Newton Mearns, depriving the city of talent and of rate 
income. The only way of ensuring this end was to see that housing was 
provided for owner occupation. 
In order to achieve this end, the old suspicion between the Labour 
councillors and developers had to be allayed. It is ironic that a natural event 
seems to have elicited a new attitude to rehabilitation and to private 
developers. In 1%8 a storm caused enormous damage to the buildings of 
Glasgow. In many cases whole roofs were ripped off and other damage was 
done which, at the end of the day, caused millions of pounds worth of 
damage. The damage was particularly serious because many of the 
properties were tenements between eighty and one hundred years old. For 
our purposes, the importance of this event was that the local authority was 
forced to work with private builders on an unprecedented scale to make the 
houses habitable. 
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Soon after the storm there took place a country-wide change in 
attitudes to planning. Everywhere the solution of redevelopment, of 
tearing down the old buildings and starting again, was abandoned and 
planners tried to conserve and rehabilitate older buildings which had 
architectural merit or which provided the · homes for an existing 
community.<10l Central government money became available to 
rehabilitate existing tenements and other houses irrespective of storm 
damage and, in many parts ofthe city, buildings were reroofed, stonework 
was cleaned and other work was done. 
A third venture which brought Glasgow District Council and the 
developers and the SDA together was the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal 
project (GEAR) which started in 1976. This government funded 
programme was led by the SDA and it included an enormous amount of 
tenemental improvement and general environmental upgrading in a part of 
Glasgow which had suffered very badly. From the beginning the emphasis 
was on help for owner occupiers of the tenement flats and, if possible, on 
economic regeneration. The success of GEAR proved that an area could be 
targeted and improved by several agencies working together. 
There was also an associated change in planning practice which 
discouraged the use of greenfield sites for housing and other purposes and 
emphasized the use of areas nearer existing city centres. Thus in 1981, 
Strathclyde Regional Council's Structure Plan laid down that no more land 
outside existing built-up areas would be made available for housing, but 
that housing authorities should develop instead in derelict and other 
brownfield sites. The City of Glasgow strongly supported this policy. The 
thrust of planning since the end of the war had been to decant the 
overcrowded inner city areas to large peripheral housing estates like 
Drumchapel or Pollock. Most of the serious overcrowding had now been 
dealt with. It was decided, among other projects, to use derelict inner city 
areas. 
It was under those circumstances that the Conservative government 
began to exert pressure on local authorities to pay more attention to private 
housing and to sell off council property. As an old-established Labour local 
authority, Glasgow District Council was initially opposed to the sale of any 
of its property, but several of its leaders convinced the Group that this 
should be done in the late 1970s. Tenants Rights etc (Scotland) Act 
encouraged this. These pressures formed a background to the development 
of the Merchant City. 
Even without the external events the politics of Glasgow were 
changing. In 1975, the City of Glasgow District Council replaced the old 
Glasgow Corporation as a result of local government reorganization. (ll) 
One effect of this was that a new group of Labour councillors were elected 
who did not share all the attitudes of their older colleagues. In a Labour 
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authority which had always been pragmatic, they were even more open to 
new ways of doing things. One sign of the times was that the authority 
began experimenting with the provision of housing by community-based 
housing associations which quickly became successful. It was a clear 
demonstration that the new Labour councillors were willing to depart from 
the old model of monolithic support for council housing and the (mostly) 
new councillors who supported this new type of housing also supported the 
experiment of selling some of the Council's housing stock. 
Soon, the old Labour certainties were again shaken. In 1977, the party 
lost its absolute control of the council, as a result of Scottish National Party 
(SNP) successes at the May elections. For tactical reasons, they refused to 
take over the Convenorships and the minority Conservatives then pursued 
policies which were not officially approved by Labour, such as the sale of 
council houses, the encouragement of owner-occupation in the City, and 
the sale of land to private developers. Unofficially, however, many of the 
younger Labour councillors believed that this was the way to go. When 
Labour returned to power in the City in 1980 they maintained these 
policies. In their election manifesto of that year they proposed an 
'Alternative Strategy' which was largely the work of the major officials of 
the council, but was accepted by the new leaders of the Labour Group. It 
proposed among other things that land which was surplus to public 
requirement should be offered first to the community-based housing 
associations and what was not disposed of in this way was to be sold to 
private developers. Thus certain necessary decisions had been taken by the 
elected members long before the Merchant City was brought to life. 
In the years immediately before and after Labour's loss of power, the 
District Council produced a series of 'Yellow Housing Sites Books' which 
identified sites throughout the City which were avilable for redevelopment. 
In no case was there much interest from developers. In the Merchant City 
the problem was particularly serious, not only because of the amount of 
derelict property, but also because, as we have seen, so many vacant sites 
and empty buildings there belonged to the District Council itself. Thus the 
problem of the Merchant City was an acute form of a difficulty which 
affected the whole of the City. By the end of the 70s the senior officers of 
the authority and the most influential councillors of all parties were 
convinced that new housing had to be built in the inner areas of Glasgow 
and that, given the changing demography of the City, this should be 
housing for owner occupation. The trick was to make this commitment by 
the City authorities into a real programme and, to do this, they needed to 
persuade the developers. 
GLASGOW BUILDS THE MERCHANT CITY 
Glasgow District Council was the principle (if not the on lie) begetter 
of the new Merchant City. Up to this point, I have outlined the events and 
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processes which formed the background and the local authority had little or 
no control over many of them. In what follows, it will be shown that other 
organizations, principally the private developers and the SDA, made 
essential contributions, but it was the District Council which took the first 
steps and which kept the process going. 
This point is important and we should pause to study its significance in 
terms of the administration of inner city development elsewhere. The 
method which was devised for England and Wales was the UDCs with the 
best-known examples of their work in London Docklands and 
Liverpool. (IZ) There are significant differences in their organization and 
methods of working. UDCs were invented as bodies which would 'get 
things done' and dispense with the 'time-wasting' procedures of local 
government. They had the one task of imposing development in the area 
and their target was the private developer. It is significant that the first 
three chairmen of the London Docklands Development Corporation 
(LDDC) were themselves developers. The local authorities were excluded 
and the Corporations were responsible to no-one other than the 
Government. This led to private meetings and decision-taking and a great 
deal of friction between them and the local community including the local 
authorities. (!3) 
Glasgow chose a more traditional method of development. Since the 
process was controlled by the local authority, there was less of a problem of 
friction or of a loss of local accountability. The fact that the areas had their 
own councillors was a guarantee of this. On the other hand, there might 
have been a problem because Glasgow District Council did not have the 
powers to deal with certain aspect of the issue. We shall find that some 
phases in the development of the Merchant City required funding of a type 
which the District Council could not give. It was at these points that they 
found ways of using money which was not originally meant for these 
purposes or they were able to call on the SDA. One important difference 
between the SDA and the English UDCs was that the SDA never tried to 
impose a solution on unwilling councils, but, as in GEAR, worked along 
with Glasgow District Council and the Strathclyde Regional Council. 
There are two other differences between the UDCs and the process in 
Glasgow. The UDCs have a more-or-less fixed modus operandi whereb~ 
they assemble land and then make it available for private developers. (I ) 
They do not normally take any part in the development themselves. The 
Labour-controlled Glasgow District Council was, interestingly, more 
incremental in its approach and its opportunistic style seems to have 
maximized the possibilities of using and improving the existing buildings 
and cityscape. It proceeded by using a series of devices and agreements 
which seemed appropriate to the particular part of the Merchant City which 
had to be developed and to the opportunities which appeared. In some 
cases this involved making the land available to the developers, but at other 
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times they took a more active stance. The Council did not pursue a Grand 
Strategy with every step laid down in advance. Glasgow's way was to set an 
aim of bringing the Merchant City and other city centre areas alive and 
then, when opportunities arose, made this more precise by deciding to 
making the area residential. Having set this aim, it allowed events and 
opportunities to guide it towards the precise form that the Merchant City 
would take. 
The second feature, which was not always repeated even within 
Glasgow, was that, as we have already seen, the District Council owned a 
large proportion of the vacant buildings and sites and thus was able to 
dispose of them. (IS) 
The way forward was thus not guided by a master plan. It depended on 
a series of opportunities. In 1981, the new Conservative Government 
changed the rules for grant aiding rehabilitation and improvement of 
tenemental property in the Housing (Scotland) Act. First, up to a ninety 
per cent grant could be made and there was no requirement that it had to be 
repaid if the owner occupier left within five years. This meant that a grant 
could be made for housing to a developer who would then sell it on to a 
private owner. Secondly, the money for these grants was to come from the 
Non-Housing Revenue Account, that is to say from monies other than 
those intended for council housing, and there was no ceiling on the total 
amount to be spent. Thus even traditional Labour councillors could be 
happy to spend the money, since it did not take anything from Council 
tenants. The Merchant City, in addition, had a special status because there 
was virtually no housing in the area and regeneration would not displace 
any of the poorer tenants. Given this new situation, council leaders and 
officials cooperated to devise a way of attracting developers and especially 
to attracting them into the area. 
A list of the sites which were available in the Merchant City was 
extracted from the Yell ow Books and a campaign to attract developers was 
launched with the pamphlet Development Opportunities in the Merchant 
City. The strategy for marketing the sites was developed at a series of 
meetings of the Housing Sites Working Group which reported to the 
Central Area Management Team and which considered the problems of 
developing sites in the whole of the City. At the level of the Elected 
Members the relevant committees were the Housing Core Group and the 
Private Sector Working Party. The first of these bodies consisted of the 
convenors of the major sub-committees of Housing and its task was to look 
at all new ideas in principle and also to clear them with the Leaders of the 
other parties on the Council. As such, it was the organization which did the 
groundwork at the political level for the development of the Merchant City 
and took the major decisions. The Private Sector Working Party was one of 
the three main sub-committees, but it was not arranged on conventional 
lines. In the first place it contained senior officers and councillors of the 
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Regional Council as well as those from Glasgow District Council and, in 
addition to them, representatives of the volume builders like Barratt and 
Wimpey. The idea behind this composition was that, if private housing was 
to be encouraged in the City, both levels oflocal authority would have to 
work together in coordinating the services and it·would also be important to 
get to know the approach of the developers and to cooperate with them. 
Setting up a committee of this type was a clear political commitment by the 
elected members and it was important in convincing the developers 
eventually that they could work in Glasgow in general and in the Merchant 
City in particular. 
In 1980 John Kernaghan became Convenor of the Housing 
Committee. This was a crucial appointment because Kernaghan was well 
aware of how other city centres had been developed and how housing had 
been brought back into the inner city. He was happy to work with 
developers to revive the Merchant City, but at the same time he was able to 
retain the support of the rank and file of Labour councillors who were, 
many of them, unhappy about working with private enterprise. He had 
been brought up in Drumchapel, one of the peripheral council housing 
estates and, although he was young and a university graduate, there was a 
feeling that he was 'one of us'. Other councillors such as the Leader Jean 
McFadden or the convenor of the Private Housing Working Party, John 
Ross, were also strong supporters of the plan, but Kernaghan's personality 
and contacts were crucial. Without him, the deals and arrangements which 
were made by the officials simply would not have been countenanced by the 
Labour Group and there would have been no Merchant City. 
Central to the dealing and the future of the area was the possibility of 
giving grants to developers, up to £5,100 per unit, for housing. This 
tempted in the developers and ensured that the development was housing 
led. The Scottish Office had actually intended the new financial 
arrangements for the improvement of tenements, but the close working 
together of councillors and certain senior officers in the Housing Core 
Group led to the decision that it could be used to convert buildings which 
were not presently used for housing and thus could be applied to the 
restoration ofthe Merchant City. The fact that there was no cash ceiling on 
the amount of money which could be spent for rehabilitation meant that the 
councillors, led by Kernaghan and Ross, took the decision that they should 
'go for broke' and spend as much on rehabilitation as they possibly could 
both in the Merchant City and elsewhere. This sort of decision could only 
have been taken by the elected members and the scale on which it was 
pursued was immense. Up to 1981, Glasgow had spent only ab~ut £20 
million each year on rehabilitation. As a result of the decision to make the 
maximum use of the new grant arrangements, £70 million was spent in 1982 
and £80 million in 1983. Only about one million in each year was spent on 
the Merchant City, but the availability of the money and the amount of 
rehabilitation city-wide made the idea of working with the sort of buildings 
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that were in the Merchant City more acceptable to the developers. 
The Labour Group was not alone in the Labour movement in its 
support for private housing development in the Merchant City. There and 
in other such schemes in the City, it had the enthusiastic support ofUCA TT 
and the other building unions. For much of the 70s workers in those trades 
had had little employment. As well as providing housing which would keep 
young affluent Glaswegians in Glasgow, the councillors wanted to provide 
work and, with the union involvement, this was a political aim as well as a 
social one. 
Finally, in considering the contribution of the elected members to the 
development, the decision to vary planning standards in order to get 
rehabilitation started was legitimized there. A number of criteria were 
affected, but perhaps the most important were the idea of the dual aspect 
flat and the principle that for each housing unit there should be two parking 
spaces. With the sorts of buildings which were available, it was often not 
easy to provide each flat with windows on at least two of its sides. The 
decision to vary this requirement could only be taken by the councillors. 
Once the idea of inner-city housing became acceptable, the planners were 
able gradually to reinstate the requirement. The standard of parking was 
more difficult to modify because it was implemented by the Roads 
Department of the Regional Council. The fact that both local authorities 
were under Labour control meant, however, that it was relatively easy to 
relax the standard, again for the early stages and it too has been reimposed 
with the support of all parties in the local authorities. 
In summary, then, the elected members played an important role and 
were by no means puppets controlled by the senior officials. Both officials 
and elected members worked together as a team and it is the relation 
between senior councillors and senior officials which is a striking feature of 
the process. 
If we tum now to the implementation of these policies, we come 
immediately on an example of the close relation between the councillors 
and senior officers. It was Ronnie Macdonald, one of the Depute Directors 
of the Housing Department, who worked out a method of applying the 
money intended by the Government for the rehabilitation of tenements 
into the work of conversion of commercial buildings for housing in the 
Merchant City. On the basis that the accounts of the developers would be 
open, a condition demanded by the elected members, each project was 
evaluated by examining the gap between the capital which the developers 
were able to put into the development on the one hand and the profit they 
wanted to make from the process on the other. Normally this was set at 
twenty per cent since the developer would expect to pay around fourteen 
per cent for any loans he might have. Among other devices which were used 
to close the gap was the practice of selling the land or buildings to the 
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developers at low prices and, in some cases, for nothing at all. In the later 
stages, other sorts of grants and loans were used to close the gap when the 
SDA became active in the Merchant City. Macdonald and his colleagues 
also persuaded the Scottish Development Department to raise the ceiling 
on the grant per unit when this seemed necessary to secure the development 
and even to grant-aid non-housing developments such as small shops where 
it seemed that this was necessary to avoid an empty property at ground floor 
level. 
The first to test water was Windex which converted the Albion 
Buildings, previously a warehouse with a bank on its ground floor and the 
upstairs empty for several years, into twenty-three flats. Some of these 
units were sold off the drawing board before they had even been built. 
Although the basis of the Glasgow District Council's success in 
developing the Merchant City was its ownership of much of the property, it 
soon reached the situation where further development needed more than 
the efforts of the Council. The first buildings lent themselves to being 
developed on their own. They stood apart from other buildings and, with 
some imagination, they could be converted into housing. The very 
construction of an old part of any city often means, however, that buildings 
may be part of a large block which has to be treated as a whole. In the 
Merchant City, apart from this, there were also the huge retail warehouses, 
in some cases up to one hundred feet deep, which could not readily be 
converted into residences. In many cases they were listed buildings and 
their facades at least had to be retained, but, behind the facades, the whole 
configuration of the building had to be changed. Instead of treating the 
Merchant City as a series of one-off developments of individual more or less 
free-standing buildings, the Council now had to tackle large warehouses on 
several floors which had previously consisted of different departments and 
covered virtually a whole city block. This was even more complex where 
they were part of a whole block, or even more, of buildings which had been 
in different ownership and use, but which were now in various stages of 
de lapidation. Many of the buildings of the Merchant City were of this type. 
It was to deal with such a situation that the SDA was brought into the team. 
The most obvious reason was that the Glasgow District Council's 
grants could only be given for housing and, for development on this scale, 
there often had to be a non-housing element. In 1984 the Government 
withdrew the housing improvement allocation and the Council had to look 
to the Agency even for the conversion of buildings into flats. Thus the 
SDA's Local Enterprise Grants for Urban Projects (LEGUP) mop.ey was 
used on a large building in Blackfriars Street, the first in which the Agency 
was involved, even though it was virtually exclusively converted to housing. 
The role of the SDA soon became more complex and essential. It became 
essential in some of the buildings being rehabilitated now where there is no 
housing. The Fashion Centre in the old Sherrif Court House could not 
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benefit from the Council's housing grant, and funding had to come from the 
agency or from other financial sources. In the renovation of the large 
buildings or entire blocks, complicated financial packages had to be put 
together including grants of several types and loans and for this the SDA 
was certainly required. The Agency was also essential at this stage because 
it was known to Scottish business in general as a partner in funding 
development of all kinds. Private firms, which might have felt less 
enthusiastic about working with a Labour Council that had not been 
welcoming towards them in the past, were accustomed to and happy with 
the Agency. One of the fruits of this was that the later and more complex 
developments led to a formalized working together of the two public bodies 
with the developers. The first example of this was in the Ingram Square 
development where a public company, Yarmadillo, was set up to control 
the relationship and to ensure that not only the private developer, but also 
the Council and the Agency, all working as developers, would split the 
profits evenly. Similarly, Glasgow District Council and a developer called 
Classical House are in partnership for the development of the Italian 
Centre. 
CONCLUSION 
This essay on the process of city centre development has examined the 
ways in which a local authority coordinated the development of a city 
centre. This is a difficult process and the Government has, by the creation 
of UDCs, implied that it was not a task for ordinary councils. Glasgow's 
experience suggests that a council can be successful. In the next few 
paragraphs I shall argue that this can be a model for other local authorities. 
One of the first points to be noticed is that local government in 
Glasgow has changed the face of the city on numerous previous occasions. 
It was the City Corporation which oversaw the movement West in the 1870s 
and, much more recently, it also made the crucial decisions to construct the 
large peripheral working class estates immediately after the War and to 
build the huge high-rise blocks on both sides of the Clyde in the late 60s and 
70s. It is irrelevant that many of these decisions were controversial and 
some have since been reversed. Any agency, whether of central or local 
government or in the private sphere, operates in terms of the values of that 
time and with the characteristic view of the important social needs. Much 
more important is that Glasgow Corporation and later the District Council 
were able to make these large decisions and to implement them. 
It is interesting to see how these decisions were made. There is an 
assumption in much of the work on British local government that 
councillors play a limited policy-making role. (t6) In Glasgow, by contrast, I 
have already pointed out that John Kernaghan was a central figure in 
making the decisions to develop the Merchant City. More indirectly, Jean 
McFadden and John Ross were also essential. In each of these cases the 
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process was not that the elected leaders simply supported the proposals of 
the officers, but that they themselves became convinced of the necessity of 
the course of action and they then convinced their colleagues who were not 
automatically of the same mind. They thus changed the direction of Council 
policy in this sphere. The fact that they were elected meant that this was 
done with the legitimacy of democracy and it was not imposed on an 
unwilling Council or City. Moreover, where each chief officer might see the 
problem from the point of view of housing or planning or estates,the 
councillors' leaders were forced to take an all-round view because they had 
to argue and work with their colleagues who would have different interests. 
This association of a convenor or a leader of the council with a project or a 
development of policy is a regular feature of Glasgow politics. In the 60s 
Councillor William L Taylor was the person most associated with the 
building of the high flats and at the same time and a little later in the 70s, 
Councillor Tom Fulton was largely responsible for an ambitious roads 
programme. It is tempting to compare this with the 'ribbon-cutting' local 
government leaders in the United States. <17> Glasgow councillors have 
never taken as high a profile as their American counterparts in the 
development of projects, but their work has arguably been just as 
important. 
The Convenors were not the main fount of policy. Senior officers dealt 
with the problems every day and it was from them that the ideas came in 
most instances. The heads of the departments of Planning, Housing and 
Estates planned the moves to deal with the development of the Merchant 
City and we should notice that they worked on a corporate basis. Later their 
senior assistants such as Ronnie Macdonald, Gwyn Kennedy and Ron 
McChristie also worked corporately to shape the ways in which the 
development took place. One cannot account for the revival except by 
understanding that these senior officers worked together, not without 
problems, but still with a single goal in mind, and also cooperated with the 
senior elected members to see that solutions were found to the problems 
which continually cropped up. 
Although the District Council's initiating role was crucial, they could 
not have gone far without the SDA. Would it have been better for the SDA 
to take over the whole scheme? 
The most obvious advantage of the existing cooperative process as 
compared with one which worked more or less along the lines of the UDCs 
is that friction between the two bodies was minimized. The SDA did not 
take over from the Council, it was invited in. They complemented each 
other in the sorts of relations they had to the developments and to the 
developers. This compares favourable with the arguments and obstructions 
which characterized the relationship between, for example, the LDDC and 
boroughs like Tower Hamlets. 
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The ways in which the SDA worked was also different from that of the 
UDCs. The latter are more prominently oriented towards profitability and 
the encouragement of the private sector. The UDCs are present only in 
areas of severe dereliction and their brief is to return the land to productive 
use. It is then for the private sector to develop the projects. By contrast, the 
SDA has the wider aim of reviving the Scottish economy in a general sense 
and the general improvement of any area in which one of its projects is 
sited. Where UDCs exist for the economic rehabilitation of their areas, the 
SDA retains a concern for general welfare even though the projects which it 
funds have to be judged in term of their financial viability. Perhaps this was 
best illustrated by a series of actions which took place during the 
development of Ingram Square. In order to create housing and other units 
there it was necessary to remove a firm which made sports goods. Instead of 
simply intimating to them that their lease was up and that they were now 
required to move, as a UDC would have done, the SDA helped the firm 
relocate in another building only a few hundred yards away. What was 
important to the Council and the Agency was that jobs should be retained 
in the area and not simply that profit was their only guideline. It is 
interesting to compare this with the attitude of the LDDC. The National 
Audit Office report mentions a dispute between the Corporation and one 
of the two Docklands' Education Authorities in which the LDDC had 
compulsorily purchased some land and then refused to sell it for a school at 
any price lower than the market price. It could not do so because the 
Department of the Environment and Treasury approval were required for 
such a course of action.<18) Thus the LDDC had one aim which was the 
maximization of profit, while both Glasgow District Council and the SDA 
were prepared to look more broadly at the needs of the area in question 
even to the extent of virtually giving away land in order to get development 
moving and, in the last Glasgow example, preserving existing jobs at some 
effort of time and money. There are other examples of the single-minded 
attitude of the London Corporation in the National Audit Office's report. 
It notes that both the Docklands Local Education Authority had objected 
to the LDDC's proposals to buy land for a road scheme which would leave a 
primary school and an adult education institute as traffic islands in the midst 
of continuous streams of traffic. At the time of publication of this report, 
the dispute had not been resolved. <19) It seemed to be representative of a 
general situation, noted in the report, where the Comptroller and Auditor 
General draws attention to the fact that community groups and the local 
authorities felt that the Corporation did not consult them enough while the 
Corporation protested that it did. (ZO) There are no similar complaints in the 
case of the Merchant City and it seems clear that this is largely due to the 
involvement of the local authority and the good relations which were thus 
built up with the SDA. 
We cannot here comment on the quality of the urban environment 
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areas. In terms of the quality of the democratic process, the Scottish 
example is the clear winner. 
Jack Brand, Department of Politics, Strathclyde University. 
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